Naval War College Review
Volume 64
Number 1 Winter

Article 15

2011

A Little War That Shook the World:Georgia, Russia, and the Future
of the West
David T. Burbach

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review

Recommended Citation
Burbach, David T. (2011) "A Little War That Shook the World:Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West,"
Naval War College Review: Vol. 64 : No. 1 , Article 15.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/15

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval
War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

BOOK REVIEWS

Burbach: A Little War That Shook the World:Georgia, Russia, and the Future

and the development of the military officer corps as a profession. The book
serves as a dialogue on those theories
and produces often-diverging viewpoints about Huntington’s ideas and
the condition of the American civilmilitary relationship.
Regarding Huntington’s “The Crisis of
American Civil-Military Relations,” the
book begins with the current state of
civil-military relations. Richard D. Betts
suggests that while tension may exist
between the military and its civilian
leadership, it is not unusual, given the
realities of our democratic system. This
is so because “objective control,” although not of a pure form, has kept the
military obedient to various administrations. Matthew Moten discusses Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s leadership of
the Department of Defense, characterizing it as a period of “broken dialogue”
marked by “distrust within the Pentagon and throughout the defense establishment.” General Eric Shinseki,
retired Army chief of staff, serves as a
model for the military response to such
strong civilian leadership, providing
forceful military advice in private, while
publicly supporting political superiors.
The assembled authors agree that military officers should avoid political involvement. When military and civilian
leaders disagree on security policy, several authors state, resignation is not an
option for the military officer, since it is
an inherently political act. Yet James
Burk comments that military officers
are also morally autonomous and accountable for their actions, not “purely
instrumental” agents of the state. Discussing Huntington’s assertion that the
“military mind” should reflect a conservative outlook in support of American
institutions, Darrell Driver cites research
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suggesting that no such unifying conservative ideology exists. Yet a number of
authors comment on the overwhelming
Republican Party affiliation of military
personnel. Other authors discuss improvement of professional military education, expansion of military missions to
include stability operations,
“Madi-sonian” approach to national security and civilian control, and the responsibility of military professionals to
build trust with civilian leaders of inconsistent military expertise.
In the final chapter, Nielson and Snider
advance nine conclusions resulting
from their research (however, not all
contributors are in agreement). The last
is probably the most instructive, that
Huntington’s work provides “continuing value” to the discussion regarding
American civil-military relations. This
book is best regarded as a commentary
on Huntington’s 1957 work, one that
also provides a good review of the current scholarship on American civilmilitary relations theory and experience.
However, keep a copy of Huntington
nearby as you read it.
DAYNE NIX

Naval War College

Asmus, Ronald D. A Little War That Shook the
World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 272pp. $27

In August 2008, Russia shattered the
post–Cold War peace in Europe by invading the former Soviet republic of
Georgia. Though only days long, that
war dashed NATO’s hopes to expand to
the Caucasus and sparked fundamental
reevaluations of American and European Union (EU) relations with Russia.
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Ronald Asmus’s A Little War That
Shook the World is an engaging read
that combines the best available history
of the war with a broader analysis of the
geopolitical forces that led to it.
Asmus is well positioned to write this
book. He was a senior Clinton official
dealing with NATO enlargement, and
since 2001 he has been a senior researcher at the German Marshall Fund.
Asmus has wide access to U.S. and EU
officials, and although uncommonly
well connected in Georgia, he is not a
supporter of President Mikheil
Saakashvili. While Russian sources were
not forthcoming, overall this is a very
well documented account.
The book offers a blow-by-blow account of prewar diplomacy and the
conduct of the war, with lively portraits
of key personalities. Asmus also puts
the war in the context of post–Cold
War Europe, arguing that the war was
about much more than Georgia. Striking at Tbilisi sent a message to Washington and Brussels. It culminated
Russia’s decadelong frustration with an
international order it believed to be
fundamentally against it. From a Western perspective, former Warsaw Pact
nations had been freely choosing to associate with NATO and the EU, in an
environment where force and “spheres
of influence” were passé. Russia, under
President Vladimir Putin, saw instead
encroachment and a running roughshod over Russian concerns (as when
NATO ignored Russia on Kosovo).
NATO’s halfhearted moves toward admitting Georgia and Ukraine in early
2008 offered Putin a window to act.
Georgia’s “frozen” separatist conflicts
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia provided a pretext that was aided by the

rashness of Saakashvili and the dithering of the Europeans.
Asmus sheds light on important questions like whether the United States
gave the “green light” to Tbilisi to escalate (Asmus convincingly argues it did
not) and whether Russia’s invasion was
preplanned or opportunistic (Asmus
believes it was preplanned). Ironically,
Georgia’s preparations for NATO
membership hurt its military capability:
when war started, 40 percent of its army
was in Iraq or preparing to leave. According to NATO doctrine, Georgia
had trained and equipped for peacekeeping operations, not territorial
defense.
Asmus suggests that more adroit NATO
diplomacy would have averted the war.
He lays out a clear and compelling case,
but given Russia’s demonstrated willingness to incur costs, the claim is not
fully convincing. Even President George
W. Bush was far less willing to risk a
U.S.-Russian conflict than were the Europeans. The disparities of interest, risk
tolerance, and geography made the
Western goal of a Georgia in NATO
very difficult without a fight, but Asmus
is correct that the United States and the
EU could have better played their
hands.
What emerges is a larger story of American overstretch and a failure to balance
ends and means. The United States simultaneously wanted to have its way in
the Balkans and the Caucasus; to obtain
Russian support for Iranian sanctions,
Afghan logistics, and counterterrorism;
and to enjoy active EU support for all
that, even as U.S. polices were highly
unpopular among EU voters. Washington did not credibly back its Georgia
policy militarily or politically, nor
would it choose between competing
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goals. Asmus thinks more skill and resolution might have carried this
through, but one wonders whether the
bigger lesson isn’t really about the finite
nature of national power.
DAVID T. BURBACH

Naval War College

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist
Campaigns. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ.
Press, 2010. 311pp. $29.95

Audrey Kurth Cronin’s engaging and
enlightening book examines how terrorist movements come to an end, focusing almost exclusively on terrorist
organizations over the last half-century.
She offers six pathways by which terrorist groups end: decapitation, negotiation, success, failure, repression, and
reorientation.
One of the book’s strengths is that it
captures the full spectrum of possible
outcomes for terrorist organizations
and explains why particular campaigns
did or did not end. The organization of
the book is laudable—by looking in
each chapter at tactics and strategies for
ending terrorism, rather than simply
marching through case studies, one is
able to examine more soberly specific
strategic approaches to counterterrorism and their effects. In this regard, this book will be very useful for
policy makers and counterterrorism
practitioners.
Cronin is cautious in making causal
claims. For example, in her chapter on
decapitation she recognizes that killing
the leaders of terrorist organizations
has sometimes contributed to the

157

eventual end of the organization
(Sendero Luminoso, for example) but
in other cases has not (Hamas). Though
she does offer insights into the different
outcomes, she tempers her conclusions
by emphasizing that the act of decapitation provides “critical insight into the
depth and nature of a group’s popular
support.” In effect, one cannot know in
advance.
The final chapter, “How Al-Qaeda
Ends,” attempts to apply some of these
lessons. Cronin convincingly argues
that decapitation will not end al-Qa‘ida.
Beliefs that decapitation will have a dramatic impact on that organization are
“tinged with emotion, not dispassionate
analysis.” Killing Bin Laden, Cronin argues, might “actually enhance his stature, in practical terms.”
Although Cronin firmly states that all
terrorist groups end, this reviewer read
the final chapter wondering whether
there are numerous aspects of al-Qa‘ida
(all of which Cronin notes in some capacity) that make it a candidate for
some form of irrelevant perpetuity
among terrorist organizations. It is
transnational in influence like no other
group in Cronin’s study. In 2001,
al-Qa‘ida struck an unprecedented blow
against the sole global superpower.
Cronin asserts that the group’s message
will have staying power for some people
as a call for resistance that will endure
for many years, no matter what Bin
Laden’s fate. This may be an unprecedented recipe for unusual longevity.
A combination of increased counterterrorism measures, a military offensive
in Afghanistan, and al-Qa‘ida’s own underrecognized organizational and operational deficiencies have rendered the
group unable to execute a successful
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